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Metaethics and the Overlapping Consensus
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the central problems of liberalism is the enforcement of moral rules
on those who disagree. Liberalism adopts the ideal that individuals should be
free to express themselves insofar as possible,' and this ideal is in conflict with
government enforcing a moral code. The dilemma of enforcing ideas on those
who do not agree has been called the paradox of liberalism.2 Enforcing
morality is not just a dilemma for liberalism, however, but a question that any
governmental system must address.
If morality is subjective-if moral truths do not have an existence
independent of any individual human thought process-then justifying the
selection of one moral precept (one person's thought process) over another
cannot be done objectively. However, if moral truths have an independent
existence, the enforcement of morals can be justified by this objective
correctness. For example, if abortion is an objective moral wrong, the person
who believes that abortion is morally acceptable is simply mistaken. If there is
no objective moral right or wrong, no moral view can be declared by society to
be objectively correct, and society will have to enforce moral rules based on
the subjective assessments of the controlling members of the society.3
This debate about whether moral systems are objective or subjective is a
"metaethical" debate-a debate, not about the substance of morals themselves,
but about what we can know concerning morals. 4 Examples of metaethical
questions are whether we can know that any moral ideas are true, how we can
I This is not to imply that there is agreement about what liberalism is or should be. The
author believes that the core concept of liberalism is autonomy of the person. This idea cuts
across the traditional division between liberal and conservative. For example, libertarians,
who are on the right-wing end of the political spectrum in many respects, value autonomy
highly. Perhaps the main controversy among those who favor autonomy is the relationship
between autonomy and equality. For a survey of some contemporary liberal theories and
their critics, see WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY PoLrricAL PmLOSOPHY (1990).
2 See, e.g., Jean Hampton, Should Political Philosophy Be Done without Metaphysics?,
99 ETHICS 791 (1989); Thomas Nagel, Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy, 16 PHIL. &
PuB. AFF. 215, 215 (1987) ("Robert Frost defined a liberal as someone who can't take his
own side in an argument.").
3 Thomas Nagel asks the question whether a political result is universally acceptable
because it is right or right because it is universally acceptable. Nagel, supra note 2, at 219.
4 DAVID 0. BRINK, MoRAL REALISM AND THE FOUNDATIONS opETHICS 1-2 (1989).
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best justify moral beliefs, and how moral ideas cause or motivate actions.5 No
agreement exists among philosophers on any correct metaethical theory, and in
particular no agreement exists on the question of whether morality is objective
or subjective. 6
In the last several years there has been an increasing interest in and debate
about metaethics. This debate has affected not only general philosophy but also
the philosophy of law. Theories of justice have been articulated in the last
twenty years that owe a great deal to the metaethical debate.7 Theories of
justice can have practical consequences in areas of social policy such as public
education, distribution of wealth, church-state relations, and punishment of
criminals. 8 The discussion of theories of justice in this Comment uses several
examples related to the question of abortion and mentions other social questions
such as the rights of children and animals. These examples show the practical
consequences of metaethical theories.
John Rawls, in his theory of justice which he calls "justice as fairness," 9
attempts to deal with metaethical questions and the associated liberal paradox
by defining a framework for government action that is neutral, insofar as
5 See, e.g., H.J. MCCLOSKEY, META-ETHicS AND NORMATrI ETHICS 1 (1969) ("We
enter the sphere of meta-ethics when we reflect about what we are doing when we make a
moral judgment . . ").
6 In this Comment, I will assume that realist theories support the idea of objective truth
and that antirealist theories support the idea that moral truths cannot be objectively proven.
For an argument that objectivity is not an essential component of realism, see BRINK, supra
note 4, at 125-30. I do not mean by "objective truth" to exclude all types of relativism from
moral realism. For a discussion of types of relativist ideas that can be encompassed within a
definition of objective moral realism, see ALAN H. GOLDMAN, MORAL KNOWLEDGE 8-9
(1990).
7 See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980);
KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONvICrIONs AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988); JOHN RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
8 In recent years there has been an increase in interest in the philosophy of law. In
particular, there are philosophers who write about law, such as Robert Audi, Richard
Brandt, David Brink, William Galston, Jean Hampton, Thomas Nagel, and John Rawls; and
lawyers who write about philosophy, such as Bruce Ackerman, Ronald Dworkin, Edward
Foley, Kent Greenawalt, Michael Perry, Richard Posner, and Lawrence Solum. The
intersection of law and philosophy has thus far perhaps had its greatest influence in law in
the area of the relationship between government and religion and specifically in the
interpretation of the religion clauses of the First Amendment. This type of analysis,
however, is equally applicable to other areas of law, such as those broadly included under
the rubric of laws affecting social justice.
9 JoHmAWLs, PoLrrICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
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possible, 10 between the various metaethical theories.11 One of the ideas in
Rawlsian liberalism is that people who hold different metaethical views can
agree on governmental policies, meaning that an area of "overlapping
consensus" can exist in spite of metaethical differences. 12 Rawls defines a
detailed conception of the person13 which he uses to derive an idea of "public
reason" 14 made up of common values on which all reasonable members of
society can agree. 15 Thus, Rawls uses his concepts of the person and public
reason to exclude illiberal ideas, which he defines as unreasonable ideas, from
the overlapping consensus. 16 This is Rawls's solution to the liberal paradox.
If government tries to be neutral to all metaethical theories, government
cannot make value judgments and if government cannot make value judgments
then excluding practices such as slavery and religious intolerance from the
overlapping consensus becomes difficult.17 The difficulty with solving the
liberal paradox by Rawls's conception of the person is that, because it is a
constructed definition, it is open to the charge of contingency. The difficulties
with Rawls's definition of public reason are twofold. First, it is based on a
contingent definition of the person, which, since it does not claim to be
grounded in truth, cannot be justified objectively. Second, reason is not an
adequate basis for selecting public reason since reasonable people can disagree
about many values.
This Comment argues that metaethical neutrality is counter to the nature of
government and that the conflicts Rawls has taken out at the metaethical level
(by means of governmental neutrality to metaethical theories) are put back in at
the ethical level with the concepts of the constructive definition of the person
and Rawls's definition of public reason. This Comment proposes a modified
overlapping consensus that is neutral only between well-justified metaethical
theories and that can be used to identify public reasons on a metaethical basis,
rather than on a merely contingent basis.
10 Id. at 95, 133-72; John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFoRD J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1987).
11 RAWLS, supra note 9, at 47-66; John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political Not
Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 223 (1985).
12 RAWLS, supra note 9, at 131-72.
13 John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHiL. 515 (1980).
14 For an interesting discussion of the development of the term "public reason," see
Laurence B. Solum, Constructing an Ideal of Public Reason, 30 SAN DiEGo L. REv.
(forthcoming 1994).
15 RAWLS, supra note 9, at 223-27.
16 Id. at 36-37, 226-27, 246-47.
17 WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERsrrY IN
THE LIBERAL STATE 79-117 (1991); Hampton, supra note 2.
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Because governmental action and personal action are different, it is not
desirable for government to be completely neutral between metaethical theories.
The nature of the difference between governmental and personal action consists
in the fact that government orders relations between people and therefore
should function on the basis of widely accessible concepts. Individuals may
choose to evaluate metaethical theories on the basis of truth alone, but a
government must evaluate metaethical theories on the basis of both truth and
justification. 18 A metaethical theory can have as good a claim to truth as any
other metaethical theory, while not having as good a claim to being justified.
Well-justified metaethical theories are those that have a wide circle of
justification. A new type of overlapping consensus that excludes only
metaethical theories that are inadequately justified results in the exclusion of so-
called "illiberal" ideas without resorting to an artificially constructed definition
of the person. This Comment concludes that government can be neutral
between realism and antirealism but should not be neutral between well-
justified and poorly justified metaethical theories. 19
Part II describes the major metaethical theories, gives an overview of their
development and the arguments for and against their truth, and concludes that
the overlapping consensus should exclude empirical foundationalism. Part III
examines and evaluates the justification of various metaethical theories and
determines that the overlapping consensus should exclude intuitionism. Part IV
describes and criticizes Rawls's idea of the overlapping consensus and proposes
a new type of overlapping consensus. This new overlapping consensus is
constructed to be neutral only between the realist metaethical theory of
coherentism and the antirealist metaethical theory of constructivism.
I1. METAETHICAL THEORIES AND TRUTH
A. Realism and Antirealism
What is realism? Realism has to do with the belief that there are truths that
exist "out there." That is, realists believe that there are real things or ideas that
exist in the world. An example of a realist theory is the jurisprudential theory
18 The difference between truth and justification is discussed in Part III.
19 This paper is written for the nonphilosopher, and thus there is considerable
oversimplification of some of the most complicated philosophical questions. However, an
attempt has been made to simplify matters without doing violence to the core concepts.
Interested readers are advised to consult the cited works for more rigorous and detailed
explications of the various philosophical theories.
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of natural law. 20 This theory holds that the law has its own existence separate
from humanity-humans do not invent the law; they just discover or describe
it. The implication of this theory is that there are right answers to every
question. For example, a believer in natural law would say that there is one
right answer to the question of whether abortions should be legal or not and
that right answer exists in spite of what humans do or think.
A more formal way of defining realism is to say that realism is the belief
that there are things that exist independently of any person's mind or any
person's beliefs or attitudes. 21 A problem with this definition, however, is that
it would mean our thoughts and psychological states are not real. 22 Rewording
this definition, we can arrive at a minimal definition of realism such as: "there
are facts of a certain kind which are independent of our evidence for them."23
Realism is contrasted with antirealism, which in its most extreme skeptical
forms says that there are no true facts. 24 Milder forms of skepticism say that
there may be true facts, but there are no facts that we can know to be true or
know to be true with certainty. 25
It is possible to be a realist in terms of observational facts about the world
in general while being an antirealist about the existence of objective moral
truths.26 That is, it is possible to believe that the things we perceive or the
proofs of science are true and describe a reality that exists independently of our
evidence for them and at the same time believe that there is no one "true"
answer to moral questions such as whether abortion is wrong. 27 The difference
20 See generally Suzanna Sherry, The Founder's Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1127 (1987).
21 GOLDMAN, supra note 6, at 7.
22 BRINK, supra note 4, at 15.
3 Id.
24 2 RENE DESCARTES, Meditations on First Pllosophy, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL
WRITINGS OF DESCARTES 12 (John Cottingham et al. trans., 1984) [hereinafter DESCARTES,
Meditations]; 1 REM DESCARTES, Discourse on the Method, THE PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS
oF DESCARTES 111 (John Cottingham et al. trans., 1984) [hereinafter DESCARTES,
Discourse].
25 See generally George S. Pappas & Marshall Swain, Introduction, in ESSAYS ON
KNOWLEDGE AND JUSTIFICATION 11, 37 (George S. Pappas & Marshall Swain eds., 1978).
26 BRINK, supra note 4, at 5-7.
27 Even if a person believes that there are no moral truths which are comparable to
observational truths, that person may believe that government can penalize certain types of
actions on moral grounds. A moral antirealist may believe that there is a right answer and
a wrong answer to the question of whether abortion should be legal, but the moral antirealist
will believe that this answer is right or wrong because of human attitudes and beliefs, not
because of an independently existing moral structure. See J.L. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING
RIGHT AND WRONG 25-27 (Penguin Books 1990) (1977).
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between metaethics and metaphysics is that metaethics concerns morals while
metaphysics concerns the world in general. Although this Comment is
concerned with metaethics, general realist and antirealist arguments will also be
discussed because metaethical and metaphysical arguments are closely related.
Realism today can be divided into two broad types, which are known as
foundationalism and coherentism. Antirealism today can be divided into two
broad types known as skepticism and constructivism. Foundationalism was the
original version of realism, and skepticism was the original version of
antirealism. One way of thinking about the metaethical debate is to view the
battle between foundationalism and skepticism as giving rise to the more recent
theories of coherentism and constructivism. Coherentism is the realist's way of
meeting the skeptical challenge, and constructivism is the antirealist's way of
meeting the coherentist defense of realism. Part II-A examines the traditional
theories of foundationalism, intuitionism, and skepticism in sub-parts one
through four. Part 11-B will examine the theories of coherentism and
constructivism.
1. Foundational Realism
Foundational realists claim that true facts exist and that we can determine
these true facts by tracing our conclusions and beliefs back to foundational
truths.28 There are many different types of foundational realism,29 including an
extreme version which holds that foundationalism need not guarantee any type
of objective truth.30 A detailed description of all of the types of
28 See NICHOLAS RESCHER, THE COHERENCE THEORY OF TRurH 317 (1982) ("Within
the epistemic structure of our knowledge of truth, such basic truths are to serve as a
foundation; other truths are made to rest upon them, but they rest on no others: like the
axioms of a deductive system they provide the ultimate support for the entire structure.").
29 See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, Metaphysica, in BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 261 (Richard
McKeon ed., 1941); RODERICK M. CHISHOLM, THE FOUNDATIONS OF KNOWING (1982);
James W. Cornman, Foundational versus Nonfoundational Theories of Empirical
Just'fication, in ESSAYS ON KNOWLEDGE AND JUSTIFICATION, supra note 25, at 229; Mark
Pastin, Modest Foundationalism and Self-Warrant, in ESSAYS ON KNOWLEDGE AND
JUSTIFICATION, supra note 25, at 279 (Pastin makes an important distinction between
foundationalism, which holds that foundational beliefs must be true in all situations at all
times, and between "radical foundationalism" and "modest foundationalism," which hold
that a foundational belief need only be self-justifying for a particular person at a particular
time); 1 THE PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF DESCARTES, supra note 24; 2 THE
PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF DESCARTES, supra note 24.
3 0 ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, EPISTEMOLOGY AND COGNITION 194-98 (1986).
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foundationalism is beyond the scope of this Comment.3 1 However, most, if not
all, types of foundationalism contain the core idea that any particular belief that
a person is justified in holding must be traceable to one or more "foundational"
beliefs that are capable of justifying the particular belief.32 The foundational
beliefs themselves are a special class of beliefs that are self-justifying. "Strong"
foundationalism holds further that foundational beliefs are evidence for truth,
not just evidence for justification in believing the truth.33
An important traditional version of foundationalism held that beliefs
derived from experience were self-justifying. 34 That is, if one perceived that a
book was on the table, that perception would be a justification for the belief.
Experiential foundationalists believed observations could be taken as true.
However, as time went on, many philosophers became convinced that
perceptions can be unreliable and that science itself must assume certain truths
without the ability to prove them, and thus science and perceptions are
ultimately based on assumptions and not on foundational truths. 35 One of the
important objections that led to the view that observations cannot constitute
foundational truths was the skeptical argument of the infinite regress.
31 The reader versed in philosophy will also note that in this discussion I elide over the
difference (if any) between deductive and inductive inferences and the related distinction (if
any) between a priori and a posteriori knowledge. For discussions of representative
positions on these questions, see LAURENCE BONJouR, THE STRUCrURE OF EMPHUCAL
KNOWLEDGE 191-211 (1985); JONATHAN DANCY, AN INTRoDUCION TO CONTEMPORARY
EPISTEMOLOGY 212-26 (1985); ALAN H. GOLDMAN, EMPNIRCAL KNOWLEDGE 189-215
(1991); W.V. QuiNE, PURSUIT OF TRuTH 1-36 (1992); RicHARD RORTY, PHmLosoPHY AND
THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979).
32 GOLDMAN, supra note 30, at 79.
33 Stronger foundationalisms would endorse all of the following theses: (1) there are
immediately justified (validated) beliefs, beliefs justified without appeal to evidence; (2) the
validation of all other beliefs must terminate in one or more immediately validated beliefs
(beliefs cannot be supported solely by other beliefs, unless the latter are foundational); and
(3) foundational beliefs are infallible, incorrigible, or self-evident. GOLDMAN, supra note
31, at 136.
34 For a discussion of perceptual beliefs, see id. at 71-80.
35 See, e.g., ALFRED I. AYER, LANGUAGE TRUTH AND LoGIc 90-95 (1946); LUDWIG
WrrrGENSTEIN, CULTURE AND VALUE (Peter Winch trans., 1984).
1145
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
2. The Skeptical Argument of the Infinite Regress
The skeptical arguments generally fall into two broad categories. 36 One is
the argument from error, which will be addressed below.37 The second is the
argument that all truths must be justified by other truths, leading to an infinite
regress that can never terminate in foundational truths. 38
A good way of posing this problem is to imitate a child who asks "why?"
after every answer. Every reason we have for a belief can be questioned and
must be justified by another belief which must have its own reason and so on.
This process will go on infinitely, and we can therefore never justify any belief
unless we can find some type of foundational beliefs that either do not need to
be justified or are self-justifying.
Realists believe that there is a difference between "truth" and
"justification." 39 Justification, roughly speaking, is the factual standard for
believing something to be true, 40 meaning what reason or reasons we have for
believing the truth of a particular idea. For example, the belief that the earth is
round can be justified by satellite photographs. The problem with this type of
justification is that it can go on forever. If we rely on the satellite photographs
as justification that the earth is round, we must justify our belief that the
satellite photographs are accurate and so forth. So, although we may have a
justification for believing something, this does not mean that it is true.
Whatever reason I provide for believing something, I can always ask "why
believe that reason?" and demand yet another justification. This is why the
problem is called the infinite regress problem.
Responses to the idea of the infinite regress generally fall into one of two
categories. First, the justificatory chain can be allowed to loop back on itself in
some fashion, thus ultimately justifying truths by other truths. This idea is
discussed below in connection with coherentism and constructivism. 41 The
second idea is that a justificatory chain can be terminated in a self-evident
belief. This is the idea of intuitionism.
36 GOLDMAN, supra note 30, at 28-41. Goldman identifies three grounds for
skepticism, which I collapse into two. Goldman's three grounds are (1) error, (2) infinite
regress, and (3) rival-hypothesis. Goldman suggests that the rival-hypothesis problem and
the error problem can be dealt with together, and I agree.
3 7 See infra notes 58-73 and accompanying text.
38 BONJOUR, supra note 31, at 17-18.
39 BRINK, supra note 4, at 31-36.
40 GOLDMAN, supra note 30, at 23-24.
41 See infra notes 74-83 and accompanying text.
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3. Intuitionism
Beginning at the turn of the century, realists elaborated the idea of
intuitionism as a response to the skeptical criticism of the infinite regress. 42
Intuitionism is a type of foundationalism, in that intuitionism accepts the idea
that there are self-justifying beliefs. However, intuitionism seeks to avoid the
problem of the infinite regress by asserting that humans have a special faculty
for determining the truth of foundational beliefs. This special faculty is
intuition. 43 Truths derived by intuition are present to us in an immediate way
that bypasses the need for any justification. 44 Intuitionists have been among the
main defenders of moral realism45 although intuitionism can also be
conceptualized as a theory of general realism.
There are several varieties of intuitionism, but the classic types were
elaborated by Henry Sidgwick.46 Sidgwick divided intuitionist theories into
three categories. The simplest is "sense intuitionism" 47 or "perceptual
intuitionism," which relies on the individual's feelings as determinants of
truth. 48 Sidgwick describes this form as "recogni[zing] simple immediate
intuitions alone and discard[ing] as superfluous all modes of reasoning to moral
conclusions." 49 Sidgwick's second category of intuitionism is "dogmatic
intuitionism." Dogmatic intuitionism holds that we ordinarily have a fairly
good intuitive sense of morals but that to state moral truths precisely "requires
a special habit of contemplating clearly and steadily abstract moral notions." 50
Sidgwick calls this the "morality of common sense." 51
42 GEORGE E. MOORE, PRINcIPIA ETHICA (1922); W.D. Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE
GOOD (Hackett Pub. Co. 1988) (1930); HENRY SIDGWicK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS
(Hackett Pub. Co. 1981) (1907).
43 See, e.g., Ross, supra note 42, at 75-133.
44 RESCHER, supra note 28, at 207 ("There must be a starter set of primitive
(ungrounded, immediate, 'intuitive') truths and, outside this special category, truths can
only be established from or grounded upon other truths.").
45 BRINK, supra note 4, at 2-3.
46 SDGVICK, supra note 42, at 96-104.
4 7 Francis Hutcheson, An Essay on tie Nature and Conduct of the Passions and
Affections, in 1 BRrISH MORALISTS 1650-1800, at 303, 303-73 (D.D. Raphael, ed.,
Hackett Pub. Co. 1991) (1969).
48 Su)mcK, supra note 42, at 97.
4 9 Id. at 100.
50 Id. at 101.
51 Id. at 101-02.
1993] 1147
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Sidgwick criticizes both perceptual intuitionism and dogmatic intuitionism
on the grounds that it is not evident why we should accept them as true.52
Sidgwick attempts to answer this criticism by defining a third category of
intuitionism, "philosophical intuitionism." Philosophical intuitionism, "while
accepting the morality of common sense as in the main sound, still attempts to
find for it a philosophical basis which it does not itself offer." 53
Intuitionism, especially moral intuitionism, has been criticized (as Sidgwick
recognized) on the basis that there is no agreement among humans on these
allegedly self-evident foundational beliefs. 54 A position on the rightness or
wrongness of abortion, for example, does not seem to be self-evident. An
additional, related criticism is that intuitionism assumes the existence of moral
experts55 because the fact that no general agreement on moral truths exists
among humans means that humans must have varying degrees of moral
intuition.56
The idea of intuitive truths can be seen as an example of the worst sort of
circularity-a concept justifying itself by itself.57 But what about Sidgwick's
third type of intuitionism-philosophical intuitionism? It is debatable to what
extent most scholars today would consider this to be true intuitionism. The
further an intuitionist moves along the scale of identifying or justifying beliefs
by reason, the further the intuitionist moves away from the idea of self-
justifying truths.
Because intuitionism posits a special faculty of human knowing,
intuitionism does successfully meet the argument of the infinite regress. One
may or may not agree that humans have this special faculty, but if this special
faculty does exist it would solve the problem of the infinite regress. In addition
to the skeptical problem of the infinite regress, however, intuitionism must also
confront the skeptical argument from error.
4. The Skeptical Argument From Error
One skeptical idea is that we can never know anything because we can
never be free from the possibility of error.58 The most extreme form of this
52 Id. at 100-02.
53 Id. at 102.
54 See, e.g., RICHARD B. BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY 192-96 (1959); MACKIE, supra
note 27, at 36.
55 BRINK, supra note 4, at 95-98.
56 See, e.g., J.B. Schneewind, Natural Law, Skepticism, and Methods of Ethics, 52 J.
HIST. IDEAS 289 (1991).
57 BRINK, supra note 4, at 116-17.
58 ANTHONYO'HEAR, WHAT PHILOSOPHYIS 111-19 (1985).
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argument says that a person cannot even know that anything outside of her own
mind exists. 59 For example, we could be under the control of demons, 60 or we
could be nothing more than a brain in a vat, hooked up to wires that feed us
illusions of all that we think we perceive.61
One response to the brain-in-the-vat problem is to ask whether it is a real
problem. That is, if I am nothing but a brain in a vat, and an illusion that there
is an outside world has been created that is so perfect that I can never detect its
falsity, perhaps there is no difference for me between the truth and the falsity of
the system, and thus the problem loses its meaning. 62
Another way to look at this is by analogy to the "many universes"
hypothesis in physics. 63 One proposed explanation for some of the mysteries of
quantum physics is that there are actually an infinite number of parallel
universes where every possible physical outcome is played out. Possibly, if
these universes exist, they do not have any contact points with our universe-
these other universes might be totally outside of our ken, and there might be no
way we could ever know them. If this is the case, it is reasonable to ask if these
universes really exist for us. Certainly they do not exist in the way that we
think of ordinary things as existing. It might not be quite accurate to call other
universes "false," but if we can never have any contact with them, they do not
seem to fit our concept of "true" since we can never verify any qualities they
may have. Things that are totally outside of our ken might be neither true nor
false-they might be simply meaningless to us.
One could say that whether or not the brain-in-the-vat problem is a
meaningful problem will depend on whether any situations can be identified
where the results of a person's experience would be different if the person were
a brain in a vat or a human in a world of other humans. Remember that one of
the starting conditions of the brain-in-the-vat problem is that the illusion is so
perfect that we can never detect it. If we could detect it, we would know the
truth and that particular skeptical possibility would be defeated.
In ordinary situations, whether or not a person is a brain in a vat makes no
difference. We will still eat to avoid hunger, whether hunger is an illusion or
not. But one could argue that a person who is a brain in a vat would have a
reason to be completely selfish. That is, if a brain in a vat is the only thing that
59 GEORGE BERKELEY, A TREATISE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN
KNOWLEDGE 45-146 (G.J. Warnock ed., Open Court 1986) (1710).
60 DESCARTES, Meditations, supra note 24, at 15.
61 HILARY PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY (1981).
62 O'HEAR, supra note 58, at 111-17.
63 See PETER COvENEY & ROGER HIGHFELD, THE ARROW OF TvE 132-34 (1990)
(criticizing the theory); JOHN GRIBBIN, IN SEARCH OF SCHRODINGER'S CAT 235-54 (1984)
(discussing this theory in nonmathematical terms).
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exists, there is no reason for any kind of altruism or consideration for other
creatures since they are mere illusions. 64 However, when you look at actual
behaviors, it is hard to detect when there would be any actual difference. For
example, even if I am a brain in a vat, I am not likely to steal the belongings of
other people for fear of the social ostracism or criminal sanctions that I would
suffer, illusion though they may be. Furthermore, I am likely to be considerate
of those close to me because I enjoy their company, whether it is an illusion or
not. If I am a brain in a vat I may choose not to give money to charities for
strangers whom I will never see, but I might decide to do so on the theory that,
since the illusion is perfect, the welfare of these others may influence my
illusion in some way I cannot predict. In addition, humans who believe they are
in the world of humans are not necessarily noted for their altruism to people
whom they will never see.
One objection to the argument that a person who is a brain in a vat would
be completely selfish is that it presupposes that people who believe they are
people in a world with other people have a reason, just because of that fact, to
be altruistic. It is not at all obvious why the mere fact that we believe that other
people have minds like ours means that we should not be selfish. After all,
even if we believe that other people have minds, we still live only in our own
mind, not in the mind of another person. The reason for altruism must come
from some other source than our belief in the existence of other minds like ours
since such a belief is compatible with complete selfishness.
What about risk-taking behavior? If people believe they are a brain in a vat
and that their physical body is merely an illusion, will those people be more
likely to take physical risks? For example, I might choose to smoke cigarettes
in spite of the risk of lung cancer because lung cancer is only an illusion.
In the first place, a perfect illusion will include pain, and this is one reason
to avoid physical risks. Secondly, if the illusion is perfect, the illusion must
include death as well. Of course, death could be merely an illusion, and if a
person who is really a brain in a vat throws their illusory body off a cliff,
perhaps they will immediately be transported into a fresh illusion. But if the
illusion is perfect, something will surely happen. We will be unsure what, but
this is exactly the situation of humans who believe they are humans in the
world. Humans in the world do not know exactly what happens to them when
they die. It is possible that our minds merely switch to another body. However,
humans in the world generally do not want to take that risk, and people who
believe they are a brain in a vat would probably not want to either. Perhaps the
forces that control the illusions directed to the brain in the vat would continue
64 DANcY, supra note 31, at 66-82.
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the illusion into an illusion of death. It is unlikely that one who suspects he
may be a brain in a vat would elect to find out.
A more general objection to the argument that one who believes that he is a
brain in a vat might behave differently than one who believes that he is a
creature in the world is the definitional consideration that one can never have
any evidence that one is a brain in a vat. 65 Therefore, one is never certain
whether one is or is not a creature in the real world. A creature that is
uncertain about the nature of reality is not likely to adopt a course of action that
would be inconsistent with one of two possible alternatives when there are
courses of action that are compatible with both.
These arguments show that it is possible to conclude that the brain-in-the-
vat problem does not state a real problem because the result in any situation
will be the same in both systems. 66 However, this argument, which simply
defines away this skeptical possibility, seems somehow unsatisfactory. It seems
to matter to us whether we are a brain in a vat or not.67 Therefore, although
the definitional arguments against the skeptical argument from error are very
strong, they are not totally satisfactory. 68
Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead addressed a similar problem
in mathematics in connection with the problem of paradoxes. 69 In brief, the
problem they looked at was whether it is possible to completely define a
system. That is, is it possible from within any system (a system being a defined
set of things that have some relation to each other) to define the parameters of
that system in a completely consistent way? This is much the same problem as
the brain-in-the-vat problem. The answer that Russell and Whitehead came to
was that it is only possible to completely define a system by separating different
categories to avoid self-reference. An example of self-reference is the statement
"I always lie." I can separate the categories of self and reference to self by
talking about someone else. For example, I can say "Paul always lies" and that
statement about Paul is either true or not true. However, the statement "I
always lie" necessarily can be neither true nor untrue.
Kurt Godel proved this concept mathematically and showed that a
mathematical system could only be consistent (non-paradoxical) when viewed
65 O'HEAR, supra note 58, at 116-17.
66 See GOLDMAN, supra note 31, at 331-33 (describing this argument).
67 BONJouR, supra note 31, at 179-81.
68 ROBERT NozIcK, PHILOSOPICAL EYPLANATIONS 197 (1981) ("To think the skeptic
overlooks something obvious, to attribute to him a simple mistake or confusion or fallacy, is
to refuse to acknowledge the power of his position and the grip it can have on us.").
69 ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD & BERTRAND RUSSELL, PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA (2d
ed. 1927).
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from "outside" the system.70 That is, a definition of a system must be made
independently of the system itself to avoid the paradoxes of self-reference. 71
Godel proved that a mathematical system is inherently incomplete in that there
are assertions that can never be either proved or disproved within the system of
known mathematics.
The relationship of this mathematical problem to the brain-in-the-vat
problem is obvious. Under the terms of the problem as defined, the question of
whether we are a brain in a vat can only be answered from outside of the
system, since any evidence of an illusion is defined as part of the illusion-as
part of the system. Therefore, the question is unanswerable. The truth or
falseness of this question seems somehow different from the truth or falseness
of ordinary questions that can be proved within the system. The question of the
brain-in-the-vat problem seems to be a type of "meta-question" and the answer
to it is perhaps true or false in a different way than our ordinary usage of
"true" and "false." 72
One might object that the brain-in-the-vat problem is not very interesting.
This gets back to the question of whether people should care if they are a brain
in a vat or not. The important aspect of the brain-in-the-vat problem is not the
question itself, however, but rather the fact that it illustrates that there are
things that we cannot ever know to be true or false, at least in the ordinary
sense of "true" or "false." There are many self-referencing paradoxes scattered
through life, like the sentence "I always lie." 73 The existence of these
paradoxes shows that no metaphysical or metaethical theory can ever establish
itself as "true" except within the terms of a defined system. This observation is
important in the discussion of coherentism and constructivism that follows.
But before looking at coherentism and constructivism, it is helpful to return
briefly to the question of how intuitionism survives the skeptical argument from
error. As shown in the discussion of the brain-in-the-vat problem, the skeptical
argument from error does have some force against intuitionism. However, it
seems that intuitionism could still determine truth within the limits of a defined
system. For example, if an intuitionist believed in a deistic god, defined that
god as the force that started the universe, and made other necessary definitions
such as the linearity of time, the skeptical argument from error could only
attack the deistic belief by asserting that the system is invalid and could not
7 0 KURT GODEL, ON FORMALLY UNDECIDABLE PROPOSITIONS OF PIwNCIPIA
MATHEMATICA AND RELATED SYSTEMS (B. Meltzer trans., Dover 1992) (1931).
71 See also W.V. QUINE, THEWAYS OFPARADOX AND OTHER ESSAYS (1966).
72 1 believe that Thomas Nagel makes a somewhat similar point regarding morals, if I
understand him correctly. See THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEWFROM NOWHERE (1986).
73 See, e.g., PARADOXES OF RATIONALITY AND COOPERATION (Richmond Campbell &
Lanning Snowden eds., 1985); R.M. SAINSBURY, PARADOXES (1988).
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attack it as invalid within its defined system. Therefore, the skeptical argument
from error does not necessarily destroy the intuitionist claim for at least a
certain type of truth.
B. Coherentism and Constnwtivism
In an attempt to resolve the problem of realism versus antirealism, a
number of theorists have devised ideas that fit on a spectrum between the two
poles of realism and antirealism. These theories can in general be applied to
both the realm of natural sciences and morals. Because the skeptical arguments
apply against the natural sciences as well as against ethical inquiry, all realists,
not just moral realists, have been involved in this debate.
The in-between positions that have developed fall into two groups. One is
called "coherentism," and the other is called "constructivism." Coherentism
and constructivism attempt to deal with the skeptical argument from error by
defining a sphere within which things can be said to be true. There are many
varieties of coherentism and constructivism, and there are also scholars who do
not see any crucial difference between coherentism and constructivism. For the
purposes of this paper, working definitions of coherentism and constructivism
will be given, and the interested reader will be referred to other sources for
more detailed discussions. 74
Briefly, coherentists say that a belief can be justified by the degree to
which it fits in with other beliefs to make a coherent whole.75 For example, a
belief that the earth is round coheres with what one knows of geography, what
one hears from other people, and what one has learned from one's own
observation that ships on the horizon gradually sink out of sight. Hence, a
belief that the earth was flat would conflict with many other beliefs. The
explanatory power of a belief is also important in determining how well it
coheres with other beliefs. One's belief that the earth is round explains why
ships don't fall off the edge of the earth.
Both coherentism and constructivism claim that beliefs are validated by
how well they fit into a whole. The difference between realist coherentism and
antirealist constructivism is that, according to coherentists, coherence of a
belief with other beliefs is considered to be evidence that the belief is
74 SIMON BLACKBURN, SPRPEADING THE WORD (1984); RIcHARD B. BRANDT,
MoRALrrY, UTILITARLANIsM, AND RIGHTs (1992); GOLDMAN, supra note 6; GILBERT
HARMAN, THE NATURE OF MORALITY (1977); MACKIE, supra note 27; David Copp,
Explanation and Justification in Ethics, 100 ETHIcs 237 (1990) (discussing confirmation
theory).
75 BRINK, supra note 4, at 103-04.
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objectively true.76 Other scholars claim that coherence cannot provide any
evidence for objective truth because coherentism is essentially a "house of
cards." 77 Justifying beliefs by their coherence with other beliefs merely says
they are coherent; it doesn't say they are objectively true. Coherence is not a
realist philosophy, these thinkers say, because it does not supply any "ties to
the world." 78 This objection may be best understood by imagining a complete
fantasy world. This world could take place on a different planet at a different
time. It could have completely different creatures from any that exist on earth.
It could have different physical laws. Such a fantasy could be extremely
detailed and complete and fit together perfectly and consistently; yet it will still
be completely false because it is just a fantasy. In the same way, a coherentist
theory might be completely coherent and still be completely false.
A reply to the objection that a coherent theory may be wildly false is that
the coherence of a theory is in itself evidence for objective truth.79 This idea
can best be explained as a probability analysis which says that the probability
that a system is wildly in error decreases as the number of facts that fit into the
coherent system increases. Of course, the "truth" of even a very large coherent
system is still a relative truth (as explained in the discussion of the brain-in-the-
vat problem), but when the size of a relative system approaches the size of the
known system, it might be reasonable to claim that relative truth closely
approximates the absolute truth of the system.
Moral constructivist thinkers believe that coherence of beliefs is important
but that moral beliefs can never be objectively true; they can only have the
validity conferred on them by human beliefs and attitudes. In other words, we
construct our morality-it is not "out there" anywhere. Moral constructivists
believe that a moral system is just a house of cards-merely a human invention.
Most moral constructivists do not believe that we are justified in creating just
any morality, however, or that a majority is justified in imposing its moral
beliefs on a minority merely because they are majority beliefs. 80 Constructivists
generally agree with coherentists that it is important that moral beliefs fit into a
coherent whole or conform to a coherent structural system.
Constructivism tries to deal with the skeptical argument from error by
maintaining the position that ties to the world are not necessary if you have a
76 Id. at 125-43. It is important to note, however, that many scholars use the term
"coherent" to refer to a system for which they claim no objective ties to truth. To simplify
the classification scheme, I am including such views under the "constructivist" rubric.
77 See generally PUTNAM, supra note 61.
78 See, e.g., RICHARD B. BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT 18-23
(1979).
79 See infra notes 100-05 and accompanying discussion.
80 HARMAN, supra note 74, at 65-90.
[Vol. 54:11391154
METAETHICS AND THE OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS
constructed system. Constructivists concede the objection that the coherence of
a system does not provide evidence of truth, and they agree that coherence
merely provides evidence of justification. However, most constructivists
maintain that what we actually mean by "truth" is "justification."
One could question whether there are any necessary differences between
coherentism and constructivism in practice, but there are some important
differences in theory. For example, many constructivists believe that the
difference between the idea of morals and the idea of experiential things is to
some degree semantic. 8' Also, an interesting philosophical problem that was an
important factor in the development of constructivism is the problem of how
moral facts could drive actions.82 Moral realists think of morals as real facts
that exist in the world. But people also tend to think of morals as obligations. If
morals are just facts in the world, like the fact that the sun rose this morning,
then some theorists claim that morals could not impel humans to action. These
theorists question how you could have a cause-and-effect link between a fact
and an action impelled by obligation-how do facts by themselves produce the
impetus to act? And yet a further problem is why facts should drive actions. In
other words, just because something is, doesn't mean it ought to be.
Constructivists say that morals are not facts but are instead the obligations
themselves, and thus drive actions directly.
The problems of the action-driving nature of morals and the connection
between "is" and "ought" need not be addressed in this paper. Adherents of
both coherentist and constructivist theories have put forth reasonable theories
about these questions.83 No theory is completely satisfactory, but the answers
coherentist and constructivist theorists have put forward are as convincing as
the answers to these problems offered by other metaethical theories.
Coherentism and constructivism successfully deal with the skeptical
argument of the infinite regress, but do they successfully deal with the skeptical
argument from error? As discussed above in connection with the skeptical
argument from error, the coherentist and constructivist definition of a system is
a strong approach to the skeptical argument from error (and the related subject
of the existence of paradoxes), but the definition of a system does not
completely answer the skeptical argument from error.
81 BLACKBURN, supra note 74, at 189-96.
82 See, e.g., id. at 187-89; MACKIn, supra note 27, at 27-30.
83 For different views on this question, see BRINK, supra note 4, at 81-83 and R.M.
HARE, 'Nothing Matters,' in APPLICATIONS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 32 (W.D. Hudson ed.,
1972).
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C. Summary of Metaethical Theories
Thus far, five types of metaethical theories have been described: empirical
foundationalism, intuitionism, coherentism, constructivism, and skepticism.
Each type is subject to criticisms of its truth, but only empirical
foundationalism is conceptually weak in -terms of truth. Empirical
foundationalism falls to the infinite regress argument which maintains that no
beliefs are in fact foundational.
Because I am concerned with government's attitude toward metaethical
theories, I can also eliminate skepticism as a metaethical theory to be included
in the overlapping consensus. Skepticism is not conceptually inferior in terms
of truth, but skepticism is a wholly passive approach.84 A government could
not adopt skepticism as a metaethical policy because government orders the
relations among humans; therefore, government is by nature active, not
passive. Skepticism cannot provide any structure for such ordering, and thus a
government that adopted skepticism would be defining itself out of existence.
One could argue that government should not exist at all and that there is no
justification for a belief that human or sentient life is worth preserving or
ordering by government. One could say that the fact that skepticism could lead
to passivity is an indictment of government, not of skepticism. I agree with the
skeptical contention that the idea that government should exist at all requires a
leap of faith to a belief in the value of human or sentient life. I cannot answer
the skeptical criticism of this leap of faith in a completely satisfactory way.
However, the criticism which says that the entire concept of government is
arbitrary is a criticism of all possible types of social action, and arguably even
inaction can constitute a leap of faith. Even the nihilist who believes that
government should not exist because there is no definitive answer to the
skeptical argument from error is adopting a position that will have
consequences and is therefore adopting a position on social outcomes. It is
difficult to understand how we can completely refrain from having a
84 See, e.g., O'HEAR, supra note 58, at 115-16.
[A] radical scepticism [sic] is a poor policy to adopt, at least if one is interested in any
sort of description or categorization of what one experiences. Like the ultimate sceptical
doctrine, that there is no truth, scepticism concerning these assumptions is going to
leave the sceptic with precious little to say, and if, like the sceptics of Roman times,
someone were to regard silence as epistemologically golden, we could point out that we
are interested in action as well as in words, and that we need classificatory theories in
order to choose future actions and to judge their reasonableness.
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government of some type, whether it be by omission or commission.
Government is an activity that happens when humans congregate, and it cannot
be stopped unless humans agree not to congregate. For this reason, although I
cannot answer the skeptical argument from error in a completely satisfactory
way, I can set it aside in an evaluation of various types of governmental
schemes against each other.
We are therefore left with the metaethical theories of intuitionism,
coherentism, and constructivism as theories that all meet the skeptical argument
of the infinite regress and are all equally successful (or unsuccessful) at meeting
the skeptical argument from error. Part 1H looks at which of these three
metaethical theories survives an analysis based on justification.
III. METAETHICAL THEORIES AND JUSTIFICATION
This Part examines the justification of the metaethical schemes whose
claims to truth were discussed in Part II. The distinction between truth and
justification was referred to briefly in Part II. To review, objective truth is what
separates realism and antirealism. Realists believe that there are true facts and
that we can know at least some of these true facts.85 Antirealists believe either
that there are no objectively true facts or that, if true facts exist, we can never
know them.86 Justification is the process by which we arrive at truth or attempt
to arrive at truth. 87
Moral realists believe that truth and justification are two different things.
Moral realists believe that truth exists whether we have any justification for it
or not. Justification may provide evidence for truth,88 but justification and truth
are not identical.89 Moral constructivists identify justification with truth-they
believe our evidence for things constitutes whatever truth things have. Evidence
is truth; therefore, truth is not absolute but relative to or constructed from the
evidence for it.90 Moral skeptics believe that moral truth does not exist, and
therefore, they consider justification to be meaningless. Moral skeptics consider
85 CRIPIN WRiGIH, TRUTH AND OBJECTVITY 1-2 (1992).
86 Some theories differentiate the degree of certainty required for a definition of
realism or antirealism. See, e.g., GOLDMAN, supra note 30, at 29.
87 This is of course a simplified definition. For a detailed discussion ofjiustification see
DANCY, supra note 31, at 53-140.
88 BRINK, supra note 4, at 126-27.
89 Id. at31.
90 Id. at 31-36.
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beliefs to be equally unprovable whether they are justified in some way or
not.91
The question of justification is central to my criticism of Rawls's idea of
"public reason." Rawls's concept is that public reason, roughly speaking,
consists of those shared principles that fall within Rawls's overlapping
consensus. 92 Rawls's idea of public reason is that the shared principles are
accessible to all reasonable persons and therefore can be agreed on by all
reasonable persons.93
What is reasonable? One definition of "reasonable" is that things that are
true are reasonable. However, in Part II, it was shown that one cannot
determine which concepts are true and which concepts are false when one is
dealing with concepts derived by intuition, coherentism, constructivism, or
skepticism. If truth is relied upon to identify public reason, a series of
irreconcilable conflicts would result because any person's opinion about any
subject could not be disproved, and thus any idea would have to be included in
the overlapping consensus. If public reasons are selected on the grounds of
truth, therefore, one will have to admit to the overlapping consensus all the
ideas that are thought of as illiberal, from Nazism to slavery, if even one
person holds these ideas.
Intuitive ideas are not any more unreasonable than coherentist,
constructivist, or skeptical ideas. 94 For example, a person may have a belief
that they are the reincarnation of a person who lived several hundred years ago.
Given our lack of knowledge about 'what constitutes individual identity, this is
not an unreasonable idea, even though it probably could not be derived from
any coherentist or constructivist theory. Similarly, it is not unreasonable to
believe that the Earth is only 6,000 years old and that a God created the
evidence of a greater age as a sort of illusion. Many of our ideas that are based
on tradition seem to have been originally derived from intuition.95
If intuitive ideas are considered unreasonable, it seems that they would
have to be considered untrue, and as has been shown above, intuitive ideas
cannot be proved to be less true than other ideas. Therefore, the definition of
public reason as containing only ideas that are reasonable is very problematic,
91 GOLDMAN, supra note 30, at 29.
92 RAWLS, supra note 9, at 212-54.
93 Id. at 241-44.
94 See Nagel, supra note 2, at 230.
95 Rawls himself relies on intuition as the method of identifying the basic
characteristics of the political enterprise. RAWLS, supra note 9, at 8-9, 13-14, 26, 39-40,
45, 116-18, 150-51.
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at least for liberalism. 96 Rawls himself has stated that ideas outside the
overlapping consensus should not be taken to be "false," 97 but it is difficult to
see how ideas outside the overlapping consensus can be taken as other than
false if they are defined as unreasonable. 98 I propose that what properly defines
public reason is neither truth nor reasonableness, but instead a certain type of
justification-wide-circle justification-at the metaethical level.
There are two types of justification used by the three metaethical theories
of intuitionism, coherentism, and constructivism. Coherentism and
constructivism both use a type of circular justification. 99 Intuitionism uses self-
justification. 100 These types of justification will be addressed in Parts Ill-A and
IlI-B. The question of justification as the criterion for public reason will be re-
examined in Part rn1-C.
A. Circular Justification
Justification is circular when a group of beliefs justify each other. For
example, I might say: "I want to run with my dog every day because I want
my dog to have exercise, and I want my dog to have exercise because I want
my dog to be healthy, and I want my dog to be healthy so that she can run with
me every day."
Circular justification seems to be clearly invalid. It rests on nothing, and
anything could be proved by circular justification. 101 Therefore, it would seem
that the fact that coherentism and constructivism rest on circular justification
would be enough to invalidate them on the grounds of conceptually weak
justification. However, identifying justification as "circular" does not take into
account the important variable of how large or small the justificatory circle
becomes.' 0 2
In Part II, coherentism and constructivism were defined as theories in
which the way beliefs fit together is important. Coherentism as a general
96 Another serious objection to the use of "reasonableness" as a criterion for anything
is simply the vagueness of the term. As Joshua Cohen says: "[t]he charge of
unreasonableness is commonly a ponderous way to express simple disagreement." Joshua
Cohen, Moral Pluralism and Political Consensus, in THE IDEA OF DEMOCRACY 270, 286
(David Copp et al. eds., 1993).
97 RAWLs, supra note 9, at 138.
98 Edward B. Foley, Rawlsian Liberalism and Establishnent Clause Jurisprudence, 43
CASEW. REs. L. REv. 963 (1993).
99 BRINK, supra note 4, at 122-25.
100 MACKIE, supra note 27, at 38-39.
101 BRINK, supra note 4, at 105.
102 For similar views, see id. at 122-25 and GOLDMAN, supra note 6, at 204-13.
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metaphysical (not specifically metaethical) theory has been used to provide a
basis for science and observational facts similar to that formerly provided by
empirical foundationalism.10 3 The difference is that, instead of basic
observational facts being taken as true, the observational facts are required to
form part of a coherent whole before they are accepted.
This idea of coherence as providing evidence for truth or justification
relates to the discussion in Part II about the skeptical argument from error.
Although coherentist theories of truth do not generally claim to provide
foundational truth, they maintain that the fact of coherence itself is evidence for
objective truth.10 4 The probability of error is less in a system where all
observational facts are explained versus a system where only some
observational facts are explained. 105 The probability of error in a coherentist
system may never actually reach zero, but it will approach zero more and more
closely as more and more facts are fitted in a coherent way into the theory.' 0 6
In a similar way, if a theory that is constructivist (and therefore does not claim
ties to truth) nevertheless takes account of as many observations as possible, the
probability of error of that theory will decrease as the number of observational
facts included increases. Thus, a large circle of justification is conceptually
stronger as an indication of truth than a small circle.
Note that it is possible for a constructivist to use a small circle of
justification. This would be a type of anti-realist intuitionism. Although
constructivist theories do not assume a large circle of justification in the way
that coherence theories do, most constructivists attempt to derive theories that
have a large circle of justification.' 0 7 The reason for this is that a small-circle
constructivist theory, because it does not claim any ties to objective truth in the
way that intuitionism does, would be unreasonable to the extent that its
justificatory circle is small. Intuitionism is not unreasonable in spite of its small
justificatory circle precisely because intuitionism makes a claim to perception of
objective truth, and this claim stands up to the skeptical arguments as well as
any other truth claims. A small-circle constructivist theory claims neither truth
nor justification, and thus is unreasonable in the sense that it is completely
contingent.
What has been said here about circular justification could apply to either
metaphysical or metaethical theories. However, an additional problem exists as
103 RESCI ER, supra note 28, at 5-40.
104 BRINK, supra note 4, at 125-30.
105 See, e.g., HILARY PUrNAM, MEANING AND THE MORAL SCIENCES 125-26 (1978).
106 The obvious mathematical analog is the calculus of limits. This is not to imply that
we could ever achieve a completely coherent system. See O'HEAR, supra note 58, at 124-
36 for a summary of the argument that we can never achieve a fully coherent system.
107 See, e.g., MACKIE, supra note 27.
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to how metaethical coherence and constructivist theories fit in with
metaphysical coherentist and constructivist theories. To the extent that a
metaethical theory fits in with a metaphysical theory, it will have a larger
justificatory circle, and thus will be stronger. 10 8 To the extent that a
metaethical theory is consistent only within its moral scheme, and not within
any more comprehensive theory, the metaethical theory will be weaker.
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that for a metaethical theory to
have the strongest possible justification, it must have the largest possible circle
of justification. Therefore, to the extent that coherentist or constructivist
metaethical theories are part of a large justificatory circle, they are conceptually
strong and can be part of the overlapping consensus.
B. Self-Justification
Self-justification can be seen as the limiting case of circular justification
that is, when the circle of justification is so small that it has only one element-
reference to the thing itself for its own truth. This is the type of justification
used by intuitionism, which derives truth from self-reference. In the previous
discussion on intuitionism, it was mentioned that the intuitionist believes that
humans have a special faculty for detecting moral truths. The self-justification
in intuitionism is that the intuitionist believes something is true because her
special faculty tells her it is true, and the special faculty determines truth
because it is the nature of the special faculty to do so.
The validity that intuitionism possesses comes from the fact that one cannot
disprove intuitive ideas in the sense that one cannot say they are false.
However, it can be said that intuitive ideas are poorly justified. As noted
above, anything can be proved by circular justification. Intuitionism, however,
does not have the benefit of large-circle justification which at least partially
saves coherentism and constructivism from this objection.
Intuitionist ideas are often thought of as religious ideas, and the extent to
which government should or should not adopt religious ideas has generated a
huge literature. 109 However, religious ideas are far from the only intuitionist
ideas that have affected governmental policies. 110 Two other categories of
108 BRINK, supra note 4, at 127.
109 See, for example, works by Kent Greenawalt, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison,
Michael McConnel, Michael Sandel, and Steven Smith.
110 As Jean Hampton says: "when values are free-standing, our fundamental
commitments are to the values themselves, and not to the theoretical speculations we
generate to explain them." She also notes that Thomas Jefferson said of the values on which
our country was founded: "We hold these truths to be self-evident." Jean Hampton, The
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intuitionist ideas that are often acted on by government are ideas derived from
common sense and ideas derived from tradition.
Einstein once referred to common sense as the layer of prejudices laid
down in our minds before we reach the age of eighteen. Perhaps the best
demonstration that many of our common-sense ideas are false is the theory of
quantum physics. 111 But in addition to conundrums from abstruse areas of
science, there are more ordinary ideas that many people accept based on
common sense. For example, people once accepted as common sense the idea
that the earth was flat.
Charles Larmore argues that it is legitimate to use tradition as a
justification for morality. 112 William Galston also argues for tradition as a basis
for morality in government. 113 Communitarians such as Michael Sandel have
argued that we are defined in part by our traditions. 114 I contend that a belief
derived from tradition is an intuitionist belief. One might argue, against this
notion, that tradition is not taken to be self-evident, as intuitionist ideas are,
and is therefore not intuitionist. One could say that traditional rules are those
that have proven themselves over time or that humans need traditional rules to
function. If tradition is justified by some other means, such as utility, it is
actually utility and not tradition that is being justified. But if a tradition is
adopted solely because it is part of the body of tradition, then it is being
justified by itself. That is, the justification of a tradition is on an intuitional
basis.
David Brink makes an argument based on tradition in his defense of moral
realism in his book Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics.115 The
important aspect of Brink's ideas about tradition in regard to the thesis
proposed here is not that he uses tradition to support the concept of moral
realism but that he argues tradition should be accorded weight merely by the
fact of its existence. Brink writes that, because we have a tradition of talking
and acting as though moral beliefs are real facts, anyone who claims otherwise
should have to prove her claim. Brink refers to this as placing the "burden of
Moral Commitments of Liberalism, in THE IDEA OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 96, at 292,
302-03.
Ill As Niels Bohr said, "If you are not mystified by quantum theory, you haven't
understood it."
112 Charles Larmore, Beyond Religion and Enlightenment, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
(forthcoming 1994).
113 GALSTON, supra note 17.
114 Michael j. Sandel, Freedom of Conscience or Freedom of Choice? in ARTICLES OF
FAITH, ARTICLES OFPEACE 74 (James D. Hunter & Os Guinness eds., 1990).
115 BRINK, supra note 4.
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proof' on the opposition to these traditions.1 16 Brink supports this presumption
by saying that these traditions are our natural starting point, consisting of
common sense, our language, and our actions. 117 However, at least three
objections exist to using tradition as evidence for the truth of any proposition.
The first objection is simply that tradition may not be very helpful for
governmental policy. For example, humans have a tradition that murder is
wrong. This is a tradition that virtually all members of society agree upon."18
However, the very fact that this moral tradition is so widely accepted means
that a government in a liberal society can penalize murder without interfering
with the beliefs of any substantial segment of that society. 119 Remember that
the liberal paradox is the problem of enforcing moral claims on those who
disagree with the validity of those claims. If everyone agrees that murder is
wrong, no problem exists for liberalism. 120 The situation is different with
controversial questions like abortion and animal rights.
Thus, if tradition is seen as deriving its legitimacy from unanimity, it is not
so much wrong as just not very useful. However, if we allow tradition to
include concepts about which there is no unanimity or even virtual unanimity,
we have a new problem. To the extent that a tradition does not command
unanimity, it is a double-edged sword in that tradition can be invoked to prove
virtually any controversial point. A clear example of this is the discussion of
the tradition of society in regard to homosexuality in Bowers v. Hardwick.121
In that case, the majority stated that the tradition in American society was that
homosexuality was unacceptable, while the dissent questioned how
comprehensive this "tradition" was.
The second objection to the use of tradition as a justification for
governmental policy is that tradition changes. If tradition is used as the arbiter
of values, it must either be admitted that tradition is fallible or that values
change over time. If we make either of these admissions, it adds to the
complexity of how we should attempt to use tradition. Should we try to
determine the direction of change in tradition and then consciously move in that
direction? Or should we try to resist any change as against the nature of
tradition?
116 Id. at 35-36.
117 Id. at 23-31.
118 There is an important distinction for liberalism between true unanimity and virtual
unanimity.
119 See Solum, supra note 14 ("When everyone accepts the premises and inferences
that justify a policy, then public justification of the policy is least urgent.").
120 Some theorists believe that even unanimity is not a justification for governmental
action because people may change their minds, or people not yet born may disagree.
121 478 U.S. 186, reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1039 (1986).
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With animal rights, for example, what tradition would we look to? If the
question the government has to decide is whether to allow factory farming,
does the government look to the tradition of the last 20 years when factory
farming has become the norm? Or is the tradition the more humane practices of
farmers in this country from 1800 to 1940? Or should we go even further back
to the times when humans did not have domesticated animals?
The third objection to the use of tradition as a justification for
governmental policy is simply that it begs the question of justification.
Accepting tradition as a guide, without more, simply means defining
justification as what accords with tradition. This is self-justification, which
raises the same objection as the objection to intuitionism. One could argue that
Brink does not blindly accept tradition as justified since he says that it is merely
a presumption of justification. 122 In an area as contentious as governmental
enforcement of morality, however, a presumption can be a very powerful
starting point.
Larmore points out that we are creatures of tradition and that rejecting our
tradition would be foolish if not impossible. 123 However, even though we may
choose to be guided by tradition in our private lives, or even if we are
compelled by our nature as human beings to be guided by tradition in our
private lives, should tradition be a consideration in the public sphere? For
example, what if there were clear evidence that a certain tradition, such as our
society's pattern of distribution of wealth, appeals to us because of instincts we
developed during the times when humans lived in small tribal societies? Even if
we find it impossible to totally go against our instincts in our private lives, it is
questionable whether government should adopt instinct-based tradition as a
presumption of correct public policy.
The problem with using tradition as a basis for governmental action
mirrors the problem of using intuitionism as a metaethical theory. The
justificatory circle is very small. As discussed in Part I-A, the smaller the
justificatory circle, the higher the probability of error. Thus, because
intuitionism by definition justifies beliefs by a small justificatory circle,
intuitionism is a conceptually weak theory for government to use. Because of
this conceptual weakness, intuitionism should be excluded from the overlapping
consensus.
122 BRINK, supra note 4, at 31.
123 Larmore, supra note 112.
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C. Justification as a Basis for Public Reason
This section returns to the question of defining public reason, and why
wide-circle justification, not reasonableness, should be the criterion for
selection of public reason. Rawls defines public reason in a somewhat different
way than will be done here. Rawls sees public reason as derived by the people
and accepted by each person based on their individual moral code. Thus, Rawls
believes government can be metaethically neutral because it is the people, not
the government, selecting public reasons. 124 In contrast, this Comment sees
public reason as derived by the government and accepted by the people. Thus,
government cannot be metaethically neutral.
There are two actors in a governmental system. One actor is the
government itself, and the other actor is the governed people. The concept of
public reason applies to these two actors in different ways. Individuals can
accept shared public reasons based on each individual's comprehensive moral
code. This personal moral code may contain ideas derived from intuition, from
tradition, from a coherentist philosophy, or from any other metaphysical or
metaethical ground. Thus, public reason for individuals is directly related to
their individual comprehensive moral code. But before an individual can accept
or reject a public reason, the government must put forward a proposal. For
example, if government does not offer free public education, the question of
whether creationism should be taught in the public schools never arises. If
government does not propose to regulate abortions, the question of abortion has
nothing to do with public reason.
Granted, a dissatisfied populace can stage a revolution or otherwise modify
a government if the government does not respond to the people, but at any
given point in time it is the government, not the people, that must select actions
that correspond with public reason from all of the actions available to the
government. A moment exists when a policy is selected. In our system, there
are several crucial moments, including proposal of a policy by the executive,
votes in the legislative process, and presentment. But at each crucial moment in
the selection or rejection of a policy, it is the government that is making the
choice and not the people. The people make long-term and general choices, but
the people delegate their power to make the day-to-day choices to government.
One could analogize to a spendthrift trust, where the government is the
trustee and the people are the beneficiary. In such a trust there are two
participants, and there is a pre-arranged structure that regulates their
124 See, e.g., Solum, supra note 14 ("Rousseau's belief that there is a clearly
demarcated divide between public reason and private interest is not a feature of Rawls's
idea.").
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relationship. The beneficiary could perhaps overpower the trustee and take the
corpus of the trust by force, which would be analogous to a revolution. But
outside of that event, the trustee has its own identity separate from the
beneficiary.
An analogy that might be closer to the relationship between government
and the people in a liberal democracy is the analogy between a corporation and
its stockholders. The stockholders initially choose the way the corporation will
be run, and they retain the right to modify the corporation, but the corporation
takes on its own identity. Indeed, corporations become legal persons in many
respects. If we view the government and the people in a liberal democracy as
essentially the same, as Rawls does, then we lose sight of an important
distinction, which is that public choices are made by an entity that is created by
the people but not identical with the people. Collapsing this distinction between
the government and the people is part of what leads to difficulties with the
liberal paradox. This notion will be defended in the remainder of this Part.
If we assume that it is government that selects public reasons and that a
government does not have a personal moral code, by what method can a
government select public reasons? The difference between a government and an
individual is that a government orders the relationships between people. Thus,
we must look at what the difference is between an individual's moral code and
a moral code enforced by government in light of the fact that the function of
government is defining structures for interpersonal relationships.
In looking at the justification of metaethical theories, this Comment
concluded that intuitionism uses a very small circle of justification. In fact,
intuitionism uses the smallest possible circle of justification, which is a thing
justifying itself by itself. Intuitionism is a uniquely personal metaethical theory
since the circle of justification does not reach beyond the individual person.
Because there is no completely satisfactory answer to the skeptical argument
from error, one could argue that an individual can make arbitrary moral
choices or no choices at all. The individual could choose to ignore either truth
or justification, or both, or to give them little weight, or to define her own
justification because individuals are free to adopt their own personal moral
codes, within the limits of law. 125
Government, on the other hand, should strive for the widest possible circle
of justification because government is a uniquely public activity. Government is
not just one individual, but rather a relationship of all individuals, and thus
government should not use a justificatory scheme such as intuitionism which is
merely personal. Government must use the widest possible justificatory scheme
125 I do not mean to imply that it is morally correct for persons to derive their own
moral code, only that it is possible within the limits of the law.
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because government is the widest possible relationship-that of all people to all
other people. In other words, government must strive to be defined by
impartiality. Thomas Nagel says, "If liberalism is to be defended as a higher-
order theory rather than just another sectarian doctrine, it must be shown to
result from an interpretation of impartiality itself, rather than from a particular
conception of the good that is to be made impartially available."126
Thus, the idea of the impartiality of government is derived, not by intuition
as in Rawls's theory, but from an examination of the nature of government.
Impartiality of the government arises from the notion of the government as a
separate entity from the people that is devised for the purpose of regulating
relationships between people. To be impartial, the government must adopt
justifications for its actions that apply to all of the governed people.
Therefore, the fundamental criterion of public reason should be wide-circle
justification. The larger the justificatory circle, the more accessible the public
reason will be to people in general; thus, the fundamental criterion of public
reason can be restated as "accessibility." 127 Although government and
individuals may be equally concerned with the truth of a moral code,
government must be more concerned than the individual need be with the
justification of a moral code.128 Justification can be merely personal
(intuitional) for the individual; but justification for public policies selected by
government should be wide-circle.129
An objection to the idea that government should consider the justification
as well as the truth of metaethical theories is that this position is realist and thus
favors realism over antirealism. That is, antirealism collapses the distinction
between truth and justification whereas realism does not, and if government
does not collapse this distinction, government is adopting a realist perspective.
However, government that considers justification as well as truth in selecting
metaethical grounds only recognizes truth in the negative sense of maintaining
neutrality toward the question of what is true.
One could make a persuasive coherentist/constructivist argument that a
government that is not fair and does not treat humans as free and equal persons
126 Nagel, supra note 2, at 223.
127 For a similar idea, see Michael I. Perry, Toward an Ecuwenical Politics, 60 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 599 (1992).
128 This conception of public reason is similar to that of Rousseau. See Solum, supra
note 14.
129 Note that this idea does not presuppose the desirability of a liberal government. I
would argue that a liberal government is most in accord with a comprehensive coherentist
or constructivist theory, but in this scheme, the desirable type of government is derived
from metaethical theories, not the other way around.
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is a government that is inherently unstable. 130 Thus, wide-circle justification
may well derive a starting point that is similar to Rawls's intuitive starting
point, but it is derived by means of a metaethical argument that bases the
requirement for freedom and equality on the government's nature as an arbiter
between people.
To say that a government must be impartial and must consider justification
is not the same as saying that a government must treat all people in the same
way. For example, it might be decided on the basis of a well-justified argument
that in order to treat all people impartially, the government must make
allowances for the fact that not all people are similarly situated. Or, the
government might decide to adopt a program such as Head Start on the
grounds that to treat some children impartially they must be treated differently.
To say that a government must consider justification is also not to say that
a government must be majoritarian. Accessibility and public reason as defined
by justification have nothing to do with majoritarianism. For example, it is
quite possible that 95% of the members of a given population might have the
same idea derived by each individual from their own intuition. If this idea (for
example, that the world would end in three years) was not derivable from any
well-justified coherentist or constructivist theory, it would not be part of public
reason. Of course, an intuitive belief held by a large percentage of the
population might well affect government action, but it will do so by brute
130 The argument is as follows: Social action involves paradoxes such as the prisoner's
dilemma and free-riding. One way of looking at the strong moral feelings that people have
(i.e. the strong intuitive appeal of concepts like the moral equality of all persons) is that we
have psychological imperatives built-in to cooperate in social actions. This enables humans
to arrive at the most efficient solutions to the paradoxes of social cooperation. See O'HEAR,
supra note 58, at 266-68. Although we might realize intellectually that we could free-ride in
a particular situation, and although that might be the logical thing to do for the individual,
we don't do it because we would feel guilty. These widespread (although not universal-
natural selection is not perfect) instinctive feelings allow humans to arrive at a degree of
social cooperation that benefits us all without allowing individuals to ruin the scheme
through too many solely self-interested actions. It can be argued that it is therefore perfectly
reasonable for government to act in a way that recognizes humans' instinctive need for
social cooperation, thus entailing that people must be considered to be to some extent equal
or have equal rights. As Thomas Nagel says:
The requirement of impartiality can take various forms, but it usually involves treating
or counting everyone equally in some respect-according them all the same rights, or
counting their good or their welfare or some aspect of it the same in determining what
would be a desirable result or a permissible course of action.
Nagel, supra note 2, at 215.
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force, as it were, not through public reason.131 To the extent that intuitive
majoritarian ideas do influence government, they represent a failure of public
reason.
IV. METAETHICAL NEUTRALITY AND THE OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS
In this Part, the connection between the various ideas that have been
discussed so far-metaethical theories, truth, justification, public reason,
Rawls's ideas of governmental metaethical neutrality, the overlapping
consensus, and the constructive definition of the person-will be examined. A
new overlapping consensus that incorporates the ideas of wide-circle
justification and a concept of public reason that is based on accessibility will be
defined.
Section A of Part IV describes the Rawlsian overlapping consensus and
Rawls's definition of the person. Section B of Part IV examines an overlapping
consensus that is not metaethically neutral and concludes that such an
overlapping consensus does not require a problematic definition of the person
to warrant government enforcement of moral rules. Section C of Part IV
discusses some of the problems with applications of metaethical theories.
A. Rmvlsian Liberalism and its Relation to Metaethics
Rawls's theory of justice is wide-ranging and general. This is good both
because the broad concepts he has developed are important and because the
room for interpretation that Rawls leaves has stimulated much useful
discussion. The other side of the coin, however, is that Rawls's theory can be
interpreted in many different ways. Therefore the person who attempts an
interpretation is engaged in a dangerous task. The following interpretation of
Rawls's work is put forward as only one of several possible, reasonable ways
of reading Rawls.
Rawlsian liberalism contains three important related ideas which will now
be evaluated as a unit. The first idea is that a conception of the political sphere
should properly be neutral between various metaethical theories. The second
idea is that an overlapping consensus can be derived that will provide sufficient
shared public reasons for governmental decisions. The third idea is the
constructive definition of the person. The relationship between these ideas is
Rawls's concept that the public reasons which make up the overlapping
consensus can be accepted by all citizens by reference to their individual
131 The classic discussion of majoritarian influence on government is JoHN H. ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
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comprehensive moral theories, without government having to endorse any of
those theories, 132 if "all citizens" is understood to mean reasonable citizens
operating according to Rawls's constructive definition of the person.' 33
The idea behind metaethical neutrality is that people of differing
metaethical views should be able to come to a consensus on the actions that
government should take, whether they can all agree on a comprehensive moral
code or not. This is the central idea of the overlapping consensus.134 The
public reasons that make up the overlapping consensus are derived by the
device of the original position,' 35 in which people choose what sort of society
they would want if they did not know what their position in the society would
be. In other words, they are behind a "veil of ignorance."1 36
As Kent Greenawalt and others have pointed out, the person in the original
position must have some characteristics in order to carry out the job of
selection and decisionmaking. 137 That is, the person might be seen as a
religious believer who believes that women should not take part in public life,
or the person might be a humanist, or a utilitarian. Rawls has tried to answer
this objection by stating that, while he does have a "definition of the person" as
the person who makes the selection in the original position, the definition is a
representation only. 138 Thus, the definition of the person is merely a device to
allow the principles of public reason to be selected. 139 Rawls defines his
concept of the person by beginning with the idea that people are "free and
equal." 140 From this idea, Rawls derives several other characteristics of the
person, sufficient to enable such a representational person in the original
position to select public reasons that can be part of the overlapping
consensus.141
Before looking at the substance of these aspects of Rawls's theory, it is
helpful to examine Rawls's use of the idea of a "representation." The use of a
representation in order to simplify an inquiry is a legitimate way of proceeding
only if the representation follows certain rules. One type of representation is a
132 RAWLS, supra note 9, at 12-13, 144-45.
133 Id. at 36-38, 144.
134 Id. at 150-51.
135 Id. at 22-28.
136 Id. at 23.
137 GREENAWALT, supra note 7, at 51-54.
138 RAWLS, supra note 9, at 25.
13 9 Id. at 93.
140 For a criticism of Rawls's idea of persons as "free and equal" as an insufficient
basis for deriving principles of justice, see THoMAs NAGEL, EQUALrrY AND PARTIALITY
(1991).
141 RAWLS, supra note 9, at 47-88.
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simplified picture such as a map, and, like a map, the representation must
reflect what it is representing. A related use of a representation is to solve a
problem in a situation when there are so many variables that finding a solution
is too difficult. In order to use a representation, the essential variables must be
preserved and inessential variables removed. Then, when a solution has been
reached, the inessential variables can be added back into the equation. Rawls's
representation, however, does not claim any connection to the underlying
situation he is trying to solve.
Rawls tries to simplify the problem of choosing a system of justice by
defining a representational person who possesses certain characteristics which
Rawls justifies on the grounds that they are intuitive. This is somewhat like
solving the problem of abortion by defining human beings as not including
fetuses. Rawls's definition of the person does simplify the problem, but it does
not solve it because Rawls has removed some essential variables. Rawls tries to
simplify the problem of selecting a just system by defining a particular type of
person to make the selection. The problem with this is that there is no way for
Rawls to add the variables back in. That is, there are many types of people as
well as many essential human characteristics that Rawls leaves out of his
representational scheme and never adds back in. 142
The substance of Rawls's scheme will now be examined. As stated above,
a definition of people as "free and equal" could also be derived from a wide-
circle justification scheme. So, my criticism is not so much with Rawls's
starting definition of people as free and equal (although, as noted above, I
would criticize the way he arrives at that definition) as with the way Rawls
expands the concept of people as free and equal into a full-blown conception of
the person derived by intuition.
Rawls cannot stop with just free and equal in the definition of the person
since such a conception would be too thin as a basis for governmental
policy.143 In order to provide an idea of the person that would be sufficient for
choices made behind the veil of ignorance, Rawls expands his conception of the
142 This is not to say that Rawls's construction of political philosophy as a subset of
philosophy in general is invalid. Rawls's idea is that the construction that is involved is a
framework or a subunit, if you will, of a comprehensive doctrine. The political sphere is the
shared part of each person's comprehensive doctrine, and all the other parts of the doctrine
can be developed as the individual sees fit. Recognizing the difference between the political
arena and a comprehensive arena is different from making a representation.
143 Freedom and equality can be seen as in conflict. The most obvious example is in
the distribution of wealth. Because of differences in human abilities, complete freedom will
lead to humans who are more talented at amassing wealth accumulating a higher than
average percentage of overall wealth. Obtaining equality necessarily means decreasing the
freedom of the most talented.
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person to include characteristics that are considerably more controversial and
questionable than free and equal.
Rawls includes in his notion of the representation of the person the idea
that the "person" must be capable of reciprocity. 144 Rawls's notion of
reciprocity is that people in society gain the right to participate in society,
including its protections and obligations, by being creatures who can reason
with others in a way that can include reciprocal recognition of obligations. In
other words, persons are not just free and equal; they must also have the ability
to contract. Not only must they have the ability to contract, but they must also
use this ability to actually engage in reciprocity, or they are unreasonable.
Rawls thus defines reasonableness to include an element of reciprocity. 145
This definition of reasonableness as including reciprocity is very important
in Rawls's scheme because it enables him to say that people who will not
engage in a dialogue of give and take are not reasonable. Because Rawls has
defined public reason as those ideas that are reasonable, this means Rawls can
exclude the ideas of those who will not or can not engage in compromise
("reciprocity") from the overlapping consensus. 146
This is Rawls's solution to the paradox of liberalism. By using a
constructive definition of the person that includes a notion of reciprocity
supposedly derived from the notions of freedom and equality, Rawls has
devised a way to exclude intolerant ideas and intolerant people from the
overlapping consensus. Intolerant people, meaning those who will not engage
in reciprocity, cannot select concepts of social justice behind the veil of
ignorance.
One might not disagree with the exclusion of intolerant ideas from the
overlapping consensus and yet still believe that the constructive definition of
the person is an indefensible way to achieve this result. The constructive
definition of the person leads to far more problems than it solves. This
definition of the person leaves Rawls's theory open to at least four serious
objections. The first and perhaps most serious objection is that, with no
reference to an underlying metaethical theory, the definition of the person is
contingent. Why should we accept the notion of rights-holders defined as free
and equal persons on a contingent basis, much less defined as only those who
have the capacity to contract?147 If we are going to accept contingent
definitions, why should we not accept definitions of humans as altruistic, or of
humans as solely pleasure-seeking, or of humans as a blight on the earth? Ideas
144 RAWLS, supra note 9, at 48-54.
145 Id. at 16.
146 Id. at 195-97.
147 Hampton, supra note 110, at 299-300.
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that are justified only by their intuitive appeal beg the question of truth. As
Jean Hampton says:
Often in his recent work, Rawls stresses the fact that the content for the sort of
overlapping consensus he is commending depends on the political society's
being a modem Western democracy with certain fundamental beliefs (e.g., in
freedom and equality) that are part of the intellectual culture of that
society....
Taking such a position, however, will undermine the effectiveness of his
defense of his theory ofjustice in the eyes of many philosophers. On this view
Rawls would be arguing: "If a society believes in x, y, and z, then the theory
ofjustice I commend will be shared by all the members." 148
The second objection to Rawls's conception of the person is that the
definition of reasonableness to include the notion of reciprocity seems quite
strained. Reasonableness and reciprocity are related, but reasonableness as
normally understood does not include a notion of reciprocity as a necessary
element. For example, it would not be unreasonable for a government to adopt
a system of absolute power vested in philosopher-kings, but such a system need
not involve reciprocity. Any merit-based selection system would be reasonable
insofar as the selection criteria is related to the job to be done, but to the extent
that a system is merit-based, it is not reciprocal.
Rawls's concept of "reasonableness" is both overinclusive and
underinclusive as a basis for public reason. 149 It is overinclusive because it
could include things based on intuition such as tradition and common sense
which are not necessarily unreasonable but do not necessarily have wide-circle
justification. 150 It is underinclusive because Rawls's notion of reciprocity as
part of reasonableness brings in an element of majoritarianism that could lead
to rejection of ideas based on wide-circle justification merely because a
majority does not approve of the ideas.
The third objection to the Rawlsian conception of the person is the
definition of the person as one who has an ability to contract. This definition
leads to the problem of how Rawlsian liberalism can encompass the
"borderlines of status" questions' 51 such as mentally disabled humans, very
young children, fetuses, and animals, all of whom arguably cannot enter into
the type of reciprocal relationships with normal adult humans that Rawls
envisions as part of the definition of the person. If governmental protection is
148 Id.
149 Id. at 306-09.
150 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
151 GREENAWALT, supra note 7, at 98-172.
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completely dependent on a type of contractual ability defined as something
which only normal, adult humans have, creatures of borderline status are
arbitrarily defined out of the moral sphere of those creatures who can have
rights. 152
The fourth problem with the Rawlsian conception of the person is that
because the Rawlsian definition of the person is contingent, one cannot even
dispute his conception of the person in the way that one could dispute the
conceptual strength of a metaethical theory. If government bases governmental
justification for moral rules on a public debate that has included norms derived
only from wide-circle justification, it is then possible for a public debate to take
place on the question of whether government has included the correct
metaethical theories in an overlapping consensus. In other words, the contents
of the overlapping consensus itself are still open to question and can change
over time. Rawls's definition of the person, on the other hand, because it is
contingent, is immune to attack in Rawls's scheme on grounds of its conceptual
strength or weakness. Because the idea of the person is a definitional
construction, it is beyond question.
The supporter of the Rawlsian definition of the person might argue that this
definition of the person follows the logic of Kant, in that, rather than trying to
justify a conception of the person on first principles, it merely recognizes what
in fact exists. 153 This argument says that rather than try to define reality or
trace it to its roots we should start from the point where we are now and
merely describe reality as it is.
The problems with a Kantian definition of the person are many. This
argument does not adequately answer the objection that a Kantian description of
the person merely begs the question of truth. Furthermore, attempting to
describe the nature of humans gives a great deal of discretion to the describer.
One could make quite a good argument that selfishness and violence are just as
much a part of human nature as the concepts of freedom and equality. And,
even if we do succeed in describing what exists (what is), this does not mean
that what exists is what ought to exist.' 54 Finally, a conception of the person
that is contingent and beyond challenge does not provide a flexible enough
basis for government to change over time.
152 See, e.g., PETER CARRUTHERS, THE ANIMALS IssuE: MoRAL THEORY IN PRACTICE
98-121 (1992) ("Animals will, therefore, have no moral standing under Rawlsian
contractualism, in so far as they do not count as rational agents.").
153 RAWLS, supra note 9, at 99-100.
154 DAVID HUME, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, in ENQUIRIES
CONCERNNG HuMAN UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MoRALs 5
(L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 3d ed. 1975).
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The problem of how government can justify enforcing a moral code on
those who disagree is a complicated problem. But Rawls's solution, which is to
give up the attempt to evaluate the conceptual strength of metaethical theories
and instead adopt a contingent definition of the person, creates more problems
than it solves.
Rawls's idea of wide reflective equilibrium, if interpreted as a requirement
for wide-circle justification, would negate the need for a complicated,
contingent definition of the person. This idea will be developed further in the
next section. Rawls apparently does not see wide reflective equilibrium as
requiring wide-circle justification since he defines public reason as including
conclusions derived from "commonsense knowledge" 155 and since he bases his
entire theory on intuitive starting conceptions. 156
B. A New Overlapping Consensus
Rawls's attempt to bypass metaethical disagreements (as interpreted here)
founders on the necessity for a government that is metaethically neutral to make
decisions about public reason based on a contingent definition of the person.
The benefit of metaethical neutrality, that hard questions of truth and
justification do not have to be addressed, is not worth the cost of excluding
illiberal ideas on a contingent basis.
Rather, the goal of excluding illiberal ideas from the overlapping consensus
can be achieved without resorting to a contingent definition of the person. An
evaluation of the truth and the justification of metaethical theories, with
exclusion of theories with weak claims to truth or to wide-circle justification,
will result in illiberal ideas being excluded from the overlapping consensus on a
conceptually stronger and more consistent basis than the contingent definition
of the person.
Most people, if asked to describe particular illiberal ideas that should be
excluded from the overlapping consensus, would name examples such as
slavery, government prescription of religious belief, lack of due process, and
so on. Rawls takes the view that we arrive at our definition of illiberal ideas in
an intuitive way. 157 Rawls says we cannot justify the exclusion of illiberal ideas
from the overlapping consensus on any metaethical basis because we cannot
prove the truth of any metaethical theory. We cannot prove that slavery is right
or wrong, Rawls would say, by appeal to any metaethical theory that all
citizens would accept because we cannot prove that the citizens who do not
155 RAWLs, supra note 9, at 139.
156 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
157 RAWvLs, supra note 9, at 116-18, 123-25.
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accept a particular metaethical theory are wrong. Therefore, our definition of
illiberal ideas must be contingent.
As the discussion of the skeptical possibilities showed, one cannot
determine with certainty what is true. If Rawls's definition of the person is seen
as the only alternative to skeptical paralysis, perhaps the sacrifice of adopting a
contingent definition of the person will seem worthwhile. However, it is overly
formalistic to conclude that, because we cannot have perfect justification or
perfect assurance of truth, we must therefore adopt neutrality between all forms
of justification and truth.
This Comment proposes that the reason we think of certain ideas as
illiberal is precisely because these ideas tend to be ideas that could only be
warranted by metaethical theories such as foundationalism and intuitionism that
are weak in respect to either truth or wide-circle justification. We may think of
ourselves as knowing what illiberal ideas are intuitively, but in fact our
conception of what is illiberal changes radically with social change. One
hundred and fifty years ago, a majority of the population in certain parts of the
country passionately believed that slavery was not an "illiberal" idea. One
hundred years ago, most males in this country believed that females were
inferior in some ways to males. One hundred years from now, it may be
considered illiberal to disregard the interests of animals. The fact that our ideas
about what is liberal and what is illiberal can change indicates that these ideas
are not unchanging truths but are based to at least some extent on what we
experience in our culture.
In Part I, the metaethical theories of coherentism and constructivism were
identified as having stronger justification than foundationalism and intuitionism.
This Comment now proposes that these metaethical theories can be used,
through the means of public debate, to identify illiberal normative ideas.
Theories that have poor justification should be excluded from the overlapping
consensus as well as normative conclusions that can only be reached by means
of a poorly justified theory. This approach does not require government to
make a choice between realism and antirealism, but it does require government
to make a choice for normative ideas that correspond to well-justified
metaethical theories rather than normative ideas that correspond to poorly
justified metaethical theories.
When poorly justified metaethical theories are excluded from the
overlapping consensus, individual normative ideas that are derived from those
theories might be excluded but will not necessarily be excluded. For example,
if one person had an intuitive feeling that women should have an absolute right
to terminate pregnancies any time before birth and another person had an
intuitive feeling that abortion was always morally wrong, one could argue that
these ideas would not automatically be considered illiberal (and thus excluded
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from the overlapping consensus) just because the individuals derived them by
intuition. The reason they would not automatically be excluded is because it
would be possible to come to either of these ideas based on conclusions
derivable from a coherentist or constructivist metaethics.
However, if the deep-rooted belief of an intuitionist was that the world will
end in three years because the Bible predicts it, this belief would be excluded
from the overlapping consensus. An appeal to the infallibility of the Bible has
an extremely small circle of justification, and the idea that the world will end in
three years does not correspond to any coherentist or constructivist theory of
the lifespan of earth that is based on a large justificatory circle. The ideas
derived by intuition will not therefore be excluded automatically from the
overlapping consensus, but will be excluded only when they are not derivable
by coherentist or constructivist theories.
The theory advanced here of a new overlapping consensus can be
reconciled to some extent with Rawls's theory by recasting the idea of wide
reflective equilibrium as a theory for government as well as for individuals. If
the requirement for complete metaethical neutrality is abandoned, wide
reflective equilibrium could be seen to include a requirement that ideas
accepted by government would have to be capable of derivation from a
coherentist or constructivist scheme with a wide circle of justification. The
concept of wide reflective equilibrium seems to be a coherentist or
constructivist concept by its definition. The view of wide reflective equilibrium
expressed in this Comment is that wide reflective equilibrium is something the
government uses on the basis of justification rather than something the
individual uses on the basis of truth, which would be more in accord with
Rawls's view.
What is the difference in what would be excluded from the overlapping
consensus by Rawls's idea of reasonableness, and this Comment's view of
wide-circle justification? At first blush there might not appear to be much of a
difference, but in fact the difference is large. It would be a mistake to think that
intuitionism no longer has a hold on political philosophy. As noted above,
Larmore refers to tradition, 158 and Rawls refers to "fundamental ideas we seem
to share through the public political culture." 159 In other words, Rawls relies
heavily on intuitive ideas in his theory, in deriving the starting point of the
theory, in defining the person, and in the selection of public reason.
If the overlapping consensus is restricted to ideas derivable from
metaethical theories that use strong justification, there is no longer a necessity
for a contingent definition of the person. Illiberal ideas can be excluded from
158 Larmore, supra note 112.
159 RAwLs, supra note 9, at 150.
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the overlapping consensus based on their metaethical failings rather than on
their failure to coincide with a definition of the person. This new overlapping
consensus would not need to make the strained definitions that Rawls must
make to support his conception of the person.
C. Problems with Applications of Coherentism and Constructivism
This Comment has used some normative examples in this paper to illustrate
particular points, but on the whole normative examples have been avoided.
This paper is not about normative conclusions. One of the characteristics of
both Rawls's concept of the overlapping consensus and this new overlapping
consensus is that the overlapping consensus can contain many conflicting
normative ideas. 160 For example, no coherentist or comprehensively
constructivist metaethical theory provides an obvious answer to the problem of
abortion. The overlapping consensus might contain many contradictory
normative ideas that would have to be resolved by public debate. Different
normative conclusions can be derived from different conceptually strong
metaethical theories. Selecting theories for how normative results are to be
reached in the event of disagreement over well-justified metaethical alternatives
is the function of a government's constitution, which can be viewed as an
intermediate step between metaethics and laws. However, it is now appropriate
to deal briefly with some general objections about the derivation of normative
ideas from this new overlapping consensus.
One could argue that almost any idea could be justified within a
comprehensive coherentist or constructivist scheme given our limitations of
knowledge. 161 However, in fact wide-circle justification offers a high degree of
guidance. The danger of a personal agenda or prejudice exists in any area of
uncertainty, not just in wide-circle justification schemes. We can only do our
160 As Thomas Nagel says:
It is important to stress that the nondogmatic moral disagreements which fall within
the public domain may nevertheless be irresolvable in fact. That there is common
ground does not mean that people will actually reach agreement, nor does it mean that
only one belief is reasonable on the evidence ....
The idea is that in such a case there is a common reason in which both parties
share, but from which they get different results because they cannot, being limited
creatures, be expected to exercise it perfectly.
Nagel, supra note 2, at 234.
161 See, e.g., STEPHEN I. GOULD, THEMisMEAsuRE OFMAN (1981).
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best to make progress in the right direction, knowing that our efforts will not
be perfect.
Another possible objection to an overlapping consensus that contains only
widely justified coherentist or constructivist ideas is that such a consensus
favors science. As a first response to this objection, it is important to note that
scientific conclusions are not the only things that have wide-circle justification.
An important category of things that could be included in a coherentist or
constructivist philosophy would be analogy to successful systems. But to the
extent that science is well-justified, objecting to scientific conclusions just
because they are scientific seems nonsensical. Objections should be directed at
the metaethical theories themselves and at the new overlapping consensus itself,
rather than at where they lead. Otherwise, a conclusion in favor of a theory
opposing science will be merely results-oriented. If wide acceptance of
scientific ideas is the result of wide-circle justification, this by itself is an
argument for science rather than an indictment of wide-circle justification.
In a similar vein, one could object that a wide-circle justification theory
would be utilitarian. I do not believe this is the case, however, at least not in
any simplistic sense. There are many ideas that could be included in the new
overlapping consensus that have the importance of individual autonomy as a
central tenet.162 Similarly, drawing a distinction between government action
and private action negates the criticism of utilitarianism that it requires
individuals to adopt the best possible action at all times and that utilitarianism
thus is opposed to individual autonomy. In the new overlapping consensus,
government has the duty to do good all the time, individuals do not.
This Comment has also not addressed the question of how the line between
the personal and the political applies in practical terms. 163 For example, can a
"good citizen" 164 vote based on intuitive ideas or must the good citizen vote
only on the basis of ideas that can be derived within the overlapping consensus?
And even if private citizens can vote based on their intuitive ideas, what about
legislators? What should be the terms of public debate? Should public debate
include non-public reasons? 165 Public reason, in whatever way it is defined,
will probably always be an ideal that will be impossible to completely achieve
in practice. 166 However, the difficulty of drawing the line between public and
private reason does not mean that an attempt should not be made. The difficulty
162 See, e.g., BRANDT, supra note 78; HILARY PuTNAM, REALISM WITH A HUMAN
FACE (1990).
163 GREENAWALT, supra note 7, at 215-43.
164 Id. at 3-4.
165 Solum, supra note 14.
166 GREENAWALT, supra note 7, at 144-69.
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of drawing this line exists not just for the new overlapping consensus, but for
any governmental scheme.
Finally, one could object that this Comment has slighted the difference
between metaethics and metaphysics. Many of the special problems of
metaethics have not been addressed in depth because many of these problems
have more to do with the debate between realism and antirealism than with the
question of how similar metaethics is to metaphysics. By defining an
overlapping consensus that is neutral between realism and antirealism, this
Comment has sought to avoid the problems of the action-driving nature of
morality and the is/ought gap, which are problems peculiar to metaethics. 167
One of the points of looking at metaethical theories in detail in Parts II and Im
was to show that many of the problems that separate metaethics from
metaphysics are problems of realism versus antirealism, given that many
scholars believe metaphysics is objectively real and metaethics is subjective.
Part IV demonstrated that government can be neutral on the questions that
divide realism and antirealism while still having a principled basis for the
exclusion of illiberal ideas.
V. CONCLUSION
In this Comment one simple point has been made, namely that government
should not act on ideas derivable solely from intuition. This obtains even if
these intuitively derived ideas are part of common sense, tradition, or are
approved by a majority. The argument has been conceptualized as an exclusion
of intuitionism from the overlapping consensus and a definition of the criteria
for public reason as derivable from a coherentist or constructivist theory with a
wide circle of justification.
This is not to deny the beauty and the importance of many intuitionist
ideas, nor is it to say that intuitionist ideas are false. Intuitionist ideas can be
the wellsprings of our individual lives. But intuitionist ideas are uniquely
personal in nature because of their very small circle of justification and thus are
not suited for a public institution such as government.
Not all intuitive ideas are unreasonable. However, the key to public reason
is not reasonableness but public accessibility, and intuitive ideas, because of
their purely personal derivation and scope, are not publicly accessible.
Defining the terms of an overlapping consensus does not'solve the problem
of what actions government should take. It merely defines the arena in which
normative theories should be tested and either adopted or discarded. It is only
the beginning of the task of defining a system of social justice. This Comment
167 See supra Part II.B.
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proposes a definition of the outer limits of the debate. In doing so, it also offers
a justified way to exclude illiberal ideas from the overlapping consensus. Thus,
this Comment offers a principled solution to the liberal paradox.
This Comment did not attempt to solve the debate between moral realism
and moral constructivism. However, in demonstrating that a government can be
neutral between moral realism and moral constructivism, the new overlapping
consensus proposed in this paper relegates that controversy to the private
sphere.
Susan K. Houser*
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Comment.
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